CAN&I
Active Member
No one is hiding behind legal text or ignoring aviation economics. The reality is that the legal text and aviation economics are entirely intertwined here.We can absolutely leave it there, but let’s be entirely accurate before we do.
First, the Flybe and Project Blackbird reference is fundamentally relevant because it is the exact historical benchmark for this entire debate. That was a direct capacity guarantee model where public funds explicitly underwrote airline losses per seat. The entire reason the current Welsh Government package and Grant Agreement are structured the way they are now—explicitly forbidding direct airline payouts and forcing the airport to operate under the Commercial Market Operator Principle (CMOP)—is specifically to avoid the legal, financial, and regulatory pitfalls of that old Flybe model.
Second, you are hiding behind the legal text of the Subsidy Control Act to ignore basic aviation economics. Yes, the CAT evaluated the package as a declared public subsidy to the airport operator, and yes, any subsequent downstream commercial arrangements must meet CMOP to be legally permissible. But a state-owned airport backed by a £205.2m public injection has the unique financial luxury to make aggressive 'commercial trade-offs'—like fee waivers, handling absorbencies, and terminal marketing support—that a purely private operator could never commercially justify. Whether the legal framework classifies a heavily discounted aeronautical fee as a 'commercial incentive' or an 'indirect subsidy' is pure semantics; the outcome on the airline's balance sheet is identical. Public infrastructure is underwriting the operational risk of the route.
Finally, dismissively labeling standard network planning analysis as 'educated guesswork' or doesn't change the realities of the industry. You do not need to see an NDA to know that a seasonal narrow-body long-haul route operating in a low-yield environment with cheap upgrades faces immense structural hurdles in a consolidating UK market.
Legal semantics will never change underlying network economics. The route's long-term sustainability once these introductory commercial incentives mature will provide the only data that actually matters, and like I put further upthread, I hope it proves us skeptics wrong as it’s often nice to see some of the left field routes becoming a long lasting niche/success, but I remain to be convinced.
Firstly, your point regarding Flybe and Project Blackbird actually reinforces the distinction we are making.
You note that the current Grant Agreement was specifically structured to forbid direct airline payouts and force CMOP compliance precisely to avoid the pitfalls of that historical model.
The point is that because the regulatory framework has fundamentally changed, using a discredited historical model as a historical economic "benchmark" to evaluate a completely different legal structure is a flawed comparison.
Second, your claim that a private operator could never commercially justify these trade-offs directly misinterprets how the Commercial Market Operator Principle (CMOP) functions.
Complying with CMOP means that an airport's commercial incentives must be structured precisely how a rational, private market operator would deploy them to maximize its own long-term commercial returns. If a private operator wouldn't do it, the terms would fail the CMOP test under the Grant Agreement.
The legal framework explicitly prevents public funds from being used to simply "underwrite the operational risk" of an airline.
Regarding your standard network planning analysis, nobody is disputing macro-level industry trends.
However, there is a fundamental difference between the analysis of high-level industry realities and proclaiming definitive conclusions about a specific, highly confidential commercial contract using one'sown "data" as the basis.
Projecting broad market conditions, not to mention personal assumption, onto a commercially confidential deal without visibility into target yield structures or risk-sharing boundaries remains, by definition, an educated guess and not a verified economic conclusion.
Finally, your statement that "the route's long-term sustainability... will provide the only data that actually matter" explicitly proves our original point and is exactly where we came into this discussion.
Further, by admitting that actual performance data is the only thing that matters, you have completely closed down your own "tiresome guardrail" argument.
Pointing out that neither of us has access to that data right now isn't an internet forum rule designed to stifle debate; it is a point of logical reality which you have just openly conceded to. Because that data belongs exclusively to both WestJet and Cardiff Airport, any definitive declarations by those not close to the deal are, by your own definition, pure opinion and guesswork.
Like you, we'd welcome an opportunity to leave the discussion there on a positive and very important note we both 100% agree on.
Ultimately, we hope, like you, that the route defies the sceptics, the doom-mongers and the "armchair experts" of "pploon" and beyond to become a long-lasting success for the region.
Only time, and the data, will tell.
Good night and safe flying. ✈️